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I. Introduction
From the 1980s onward, the majority of the literature on social security funds has focused on fund returns, finding that social security funds are not able to obtain excess market returns, which in turn reflects the efficient market hypothesis in the US and the UK. Current research, however, has used a larger sample and advanced methods to show that it is possible to obtain excess market returns. This paper focuses on market stabilization and investor return perspectives to scrutinize previous research.
The majority of the research indicates that pension fund returns cannot exceed market returns, stated for example by Beebower and Bergstrom (1977) , who studied the portfolios of 148 pension funds in the United States from [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] . The authors used the CAPM model to calculate the sample's Jensen alpha and they found that the pension funds' returns are lower than the S&P 500 by 144 percentage points. Similarly, Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) analyzed 91 US pension funds and found that their return was lower than the S&P 500 by 1.1 percent. Ippolito and Turner (1987) point out that the small sample size of pension funds will affect statistical tests; a survival bias could have a direct impact on the calculation results. To solve this problem, Ippolito and Turner selected a larger sample of 1526 US pension funds whose returns were lower than the S&P 500 by only 0.44 percent. Since the 1980s both pension size and the number of pension funds in the United States have increased, while pension fund returns have not. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishney (1992) , for instance, selected 769 pension funds in the United States from the 1980s. These funds' returns were lower than the S&P 500 by 1.3 percent. The same holds true for the UK.
Here, Thomas and Tonks (2001) selected 2175 pension funds from 1984 to 1997, showing that the pension funds do not achieve excess returns. Gregory and Tonks (2004) demonstrate that the English pension funds they studied have a home bias, but
were still unable to achieve extra market returns.
In order to identify the reasons for the low investment income of pension funds, many researchers analyze investment ability and asset allocation. For example, Coggin,
Fabozzi and Rahman (1993) analyzed a sample of 71 pension funds in the United
States, from the angle of the fund managers' stock-picking and timing ability. They found that pension funds have a positive stock-picking ability. However, their timing ability is low and therefore reduces investment return. Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann (1999) also show that the fund managers' stock-picking and timing ability make a negative contribution towards 364 selected English pension funds from 1986-1994.
The idea that pension funds cannot obtain extra market returns confirms the "efficient market hypothesis", which suggests that timely information will affect price, and that investors cannot always achieve excess returns (Fama, 1970) . To the contrary, many scholars in recent years have found that pension funds are able to obtain excess returns. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006), e.g., find that the 401k plan in the United States, which is entrusted to mutual funds, has a higher annual average return than that of the stock index by 0.31 percent. Bauer et al. (2010) selected 463 pension funds in the United States from 1990 to 2006 and found that the observed pension funds taken together do not obtain excess returns; however, a few individual small-scale pension funds are able to achieve excess returns of 3 percent.
Current studies identify three main reasons for pension funds' ability to generate excess returns: centralized investment, active investment and private information arbitrage. Firstly, as professional institutional investors, funds (including pension funds) have a distinct advantage in investment techniques and information gathering methods and are therefore able to obtain higher returns using centralized investment (Levy and Livingston, 1995) . Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) found that investment ability has an increasing returns-to-scale effect; thus fund managers will select a centralized investment strategy. Investment diversification, on the other hand, may decrease risk, but may not achieve the same returns. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) found that a professional analysis can enhance performance considerably. They constructed an industry concentration indicator and found that mutual fund returns are positively correlated with portfolio concentration.
The second reason is active investment. Wermers (2000) states that funds that are highly active each year can achieve 1.3 percent in excess returns. Wermers (2003) used the tracking error of the active investment capacity of the fund portfolio and the S&P 500 index to measure the fund's active investment and confirms that active investment funds have a greater stock-picking ability. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) used the deviation of fund portfolio and index fund to build active investment indicators. They show that active investment in the fund can lead to excess returns.
The greater the deviation of the fund portfolio from the index, the higher the achievable returns can be. The third reason for excess returns is private information arbitrage. In an imperfect market, asset information distribution is unbalanced. In other words, some financial actors have more useful information about an asset than others. Informed traders may use this private information to generate higher returns (Merton, 1987) . Fund managers, through a variety of bonus incentives, will increase their efforts to study market trends, collect stocks' private information, and will therefore benefit from private information. Nevertheless, there are many important issues which remain unanswered in China. Is the CNSSF able to perform better than the market and can it achieve excess returns?
Is there any performance difference between the CNCSSF direct stock investment and entrusted investment? Is CNSSF return related to the access to inside market information and to asset allocation? We aim to select a larger sample and longer time span than the existing studies by using the Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997) four-factor model, as well as a panel data analysis to examine these issues and to provide a deeper understanding of CNSSF investment efficiency.
In addition, the market-stabilizing effect of the social security fund has been proven.
Guercio and Tkac (2002) found that market-oriented operations of pension funds in the market act as "automatic stabilizers". As a result there is a linear relationship between liquidity and pension fund performance. Pension funds have the ability to select fund managers, they can retract investments when fund performance is bad, and can, conversely, increase investment when fund performance is good. Pension funds entrust investors and put pressure on fund managers to secure lower risk and higher returns, which can decrease market system risk and stabilize the market. Bohl (2006) suggests that Polish pension funds affect the stock market index in a way that reduces the degree of fluctuations in the market. Although He (2007) The Chinese disclosure obligation of listed companies, however, gives us access to the CNSSF's equity investments. Since listed companies are required to disclose the number of their shareholders and the shareholders' names, we have access to shareholder information and select the information according to "CNSSF *** combination", "CNSSF *** portfolio" in order to collect the social security fund portfolio investment details. To ensure the validity of the entrusted investment details, we used the disclosed CNSSF portfolio information provided by the CNCSSF website in order to verify and complement the CNSSF investment details (see Table 1 ). We distinguish between direct investments and entrusted CNSFF investments. All the data stems from the Wind database.
From the Wind database we obtained CNCSSF holdings data, stock yield, the size of the stock assets, financial data, the return of net asset value, and scale data from securities companies. In order to ensure data quality, we randomly selected sample data and we also used the RESSET database (RESSET) to compare differences in the data. If there was a discrepancy between the Wind database and the RESSET database, 1 we downloaded the annual reports from the websites of Shanghai Stock
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange to review the statements. CNSSF Annual Report data stems from the CNCSSF website. 
Research Design
Firstly, can the CNSSF's stock investment achieve excess returns? From the data collected, we can observe that the CNSSF prefers to invest partially in share funds and hybrid funds and is thus exposed to more risk. According to classical investment theory (Fama and French, 1993) , if the CNSSF achieves extra market gains after the risk-adjusted market returns, the investment can be regarded as efficient, otherwise it is inefficient. We use Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
Empirical Analysis

Variable Construction
Portfolio return
We followed the method used by Wermers (2003) , Cremers and Petajisto (2009), using weight sum returns to obtain the CNSSF portfolio return, resulting in:
where t i P , is the price of stock i in portfolio at time t ,
Divd , is the dividends of stock i from t-1 to t . We compared direct investment returns and entrusted investment returns of CNCSSF using a t-test. The test results are reported in Table 3 . Taking into account that the yield data may not follow a normal distribution, the non-parametric Wilcoxon pvalues are also reported.
Sample description
The results in Table 3 show that the average monthly return of direct investment is 1.18 percent, while the average monthly return of entrusted investment is 2.53 percent.
The difference is thus 1.35 percent. The result is significant at the 1-percent level, the t value is 3.17 and it therefore passes the Wilcoxon test. The average direct investment return is significantly lower than the average return of entrusted investment. For a more detailed analysis, we took a closer look at the differences between the returns of direct investment and entrusted investment, and tested whether the differences are statistically significant. The only funds that do not pass the t value test are China Merchants Fund and CICC; the t values of the remaining funds pass the test. The initial results in Table 3 confirm that investment efficiency is lower for direct investment compared to entrusted investment, but the p-value of Huaxia Fund and South Fund is not statistically significant. It should therefore be further researched by means of a time series angle-depth study. *, **, *** denote significance at10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
Investment efficiency
According to classical investment theory, a fund's investment income and investment risk are closely related. A high yield is not always the result of high efficiency; it may also be a compensation for great risk. The risk-adjusted return on investment can measure the level of efficiency of the investment. We used the Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997) four-factor model to measure the risk-adjusted CNSSF portfolio returns. Empirical research generally believes that assets' return can be explained by the four-factor model. The intercept (alpha) reflects the abnormal returns which the risk factors cannot explain. If alpha is statistically significantly greater than 0, the fund's investment portfolio is able to achieve excess returns and fund managers have superior stock-picking ability and greater investment efficiency. Conversely, if the alpha is statistically significantly smaller than 0, the fund manager has low investment efficiency. The four-factor model is expressed as follows:
is the reinvested consolidated monthly market rate of return of market capitalization-weighted cash dividends; R is the risk-free rate equal to the one-year deposit interest rate divided by 12; SMB, HML are scale factor and book-to-market ratio factor, in line with Fama and French (1993) ; MOM is the structure momentum factor, in line with Carhart (1997) . The regression results and Newey-West adjusted tvalues are reported in Table 4 . Panel A is equally weighted, Panel B is weighted by the total net value, and Panel C is weighted by the sum of the flow of funds.
The regression results of the four-factor model and adjusted t values using the NeweyWest method are reported in Table 4 . We use the Newey-West method because the regression residual may be correlated. It also can control for the residual autocorrelation of the regression to obtain a more accurate t value. The Adj.R 2 of all models in Table 4 are greater than 0.6, the overall sample Adj. Panel A that the alpha of the social security fund portfolio as a whole is positive, but not statistically significant, indicating that after the fund's investment risk is taken into account, the social security fund cannot obtain excess returns. The direct investment alpha is not statistically significant, but the entrusted investment alpha is significant at the 10% level with a value of 0.36%. In other words, entrusted portfolios can achieve abnormal returns of 4.32% a year.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of entrusted investment fund risk-adjusted returns. It can be seen that entrusted investment fund companies perform differently.
Boshi Fund, the South Fund, Zhaoshang Fund and Yifangda fund are able to obtain statistically significant excess yields, while the remaining funds cannot obtain abnormal returns. CICC's excess return is significantly negative at the 5% level.
Among them, the highest excess return comes from the South Fund, with annual excess returns of 17.1, followed by Yifangda fund (9.56 percent), Zhaoshang Fund (9.12 percent) and Boshi Fund (5.65 percent).
The results in Table 4 show that the overall efficiency of the national social security fund investment is not high; only 40 percent of entrusted investment institutions are able to obtain excess returns. Overall, the efficiency of direct investment is lower than that of entrusted investment. The returns of entrusted investments are quite diverse;
the South Fund's investment shows the highest level of efficiency, while CICC investment is the least efficient. 
Cause for differences in investment efficiency
Investment Style
If the risk factor coefficients in Table 4 are statistically significant, we can infer information about the style of the social security fund's investment (Davis, 2001 ). The market portfolio coefficient factor of direct investment is 1.2, which is significant at the 1% level. However, the remaining coefficient factors are not statistically significant; the market portfolio coefficient factor of entrusted investment is 0.949, and the four factors are all statistically significant. This result suggests that direct investment prefers high-risk stocks but cannot obtain excess returns while entrusted investment funds prefer to vary investment scale and investment momentum to obtain excess returns. In addition, the South Fund's momentum factor is significantly positive, indicating that the South Fund has the "momentum effect", i.e. it follows the investment style of buying the winners and selling the losers. All risk factors in the Yifangda Fund are statistically significant, but the market factor coefficient is only 0.9, indicating an overall lower risk. Yifangda tends to invest in small companies with a low book-to-market value and to use momentum investment strategy. The Boshi Fund reveals low market risk, high momentum investment and a high book-to-market investment style. Simple investment styles, as well as the excess configuration of the high-risk stocks may be the reasons for the low efficiency of the social security fund investment.
Asset Allocation
The previous section already confirms that the CNSSF pursues two different investment styles and that they differ significantly in efficiency. Merton (1987) suggests in his theory that, due to the presence of market transaction costs and To clarify the role of private information on the social security fund investment return there is a need to control the risk of the portfolio (Beta), the breadth of asset allocation (Width) and the depth (Depth). Table 5 shows the results of the comparison of the CNSSF portfolio asset allocation types. Panel A exhibits the average of the overall sample of the CNSSF and direct investment. The results indicate that access to private information of the overall sample is 0.438, while that of direct investment is 0.398, i.e., it is lower than the overall access to private information, and therefore lower than access to private information on the part of the entrusted companies. The average risk coefficient of direct investment stock is 1.03, higher than the overall average. Direct investment indicators for both depth and breadth are below those of entrusted investment.
For a clearer comparison between direct investment and entrusted investment asset allocation differences, we subtracted the direct investment asset allocation indicator from the entrusted investment asset allocation indicator, and then used a t-test to test for statistical significance. Table 5 , Panel B, shows that the entrusted investment's access to private information is significantly higher compared to direct investment at the 1-percent significance level. This shows that access to private information is greater for entrusted investment than direct investment, and that access to private information may achieve higher returns.
Secondly, from the aspect of the equity portfolio risk coefficient, the beta coefficient of Boshi Fund, Harvest Fund and the other four funds is significantly lower than that of direct investment. The equity portfolio's beta coefficient of Huaxia Fund, South
Fund, and CICC is significantly higher than that of the direct investment portfolio. In addition, with the exception of the Guotai Fund, the disparity indicators of the rest of the fund's asset allocation depth is significantly higher than those of the direct investment portfolio, and the fund's asset allocation breadth indicators are significantly lower than those of the direct investment portfolio. These two indicators fully explain that the CNSSF entrusted investments are very concentrated, which may be one of the reasons for the low return from direct investment. The data used in this paper is quarterly unbalanced panel data. There are two ways to conduct an unbalanced panel data regression: fixed effects regression and random effects regression. The fixed effects regression assumes that the individual effects of the sample do not change with time, i.e., one can use the first-order differential or centralization to eliminate the individual effects, and then conduct an OLS regression to determine the coefficient. A random effects regression assumes that the individual effects cannot be observed over time, and it is possible to run a GLS regression to obtain the coefficient. We have taken into account that the individual effects, such as corporate culture of the social security funds which cannot be observed, may have an important impact on investment performance. In order to avoid endogeneity problems by omitting variables, we used a fixed effects model for our analysis and run a
Hausman test as a robustness check. Table 6 shows that all regressions from the Hausman test are significant at the 5 percent level. The table also The PI * DI variable coefficient is negative, indicating that the return on direct investment is lower than the return on entrusted investment The coefficient however, is not statistically significant, indicating that direct investment and entrusted investment do not significantly differ from each other.
Results in Table 6 confirm that the fund's investment return is significantly related to the private information of fund asset allocation, the risk factor and dispersion. After controlling for other factors, there is no significant difference between the social security fund's direct investment and entrusted investment returns. 
Endogenous analysis
Since we are not able to observe the correlation between the individual fund characteristics using investment performance, we use the fixed-effect model to reduce the endogeneity problem caused by omitting variables. However, the allocation of private information may still evoke endogeneity problems because institutional investors' portfolios may cause a "herding" effect (Patrick and Strickland, 2002; Liu and Tang, 2011) .The stock price may react to information timely, increasing prices may attract market attention, thus private information may become public information.; so private information may be affected by the stock price. This establishes a reverse causal relationship between fund return and private information.
To solve this endogenous problem, we used a two-stage instrumental variable method for our analysis.
The difficulty lies in that the two-stage instrumental variable regression needs to select the appropriate instrumental variables that meet two conditions. Firstly, instrumental variables must be closely related to private information about the configuration of social security fund assets. Secondly, instrumental variables and the investment return must not be related. From the fund company's R&D point of view, we selected the average amount of private information of the fund's equity portfolio as the instrumental variable. The fund company's research department will likely share the research reports within the company. So the social security fund portfolio, like other funds, will also be affected by R&D information inside the company.
Therefore, the private information of the social security fund portfolio should be associated with the company's average amount of private information (Nanda et al., 2004) . For example, every Chinese mutual fund company has a meaningful research department for intensive research. However, they also buy analysis reports from other brokers, thus sharing information with other mutual fund companies. Secondly, the correlation between the average amount of fund companies' private information and a social security fund portfolio's return must not be high. In this paper, we use an
Anderson LR test to check whether the instrumental variables exhibit a weak instrument problem, a Cragg-Donald Wald test to check whether the instrumental variables exhibit an under-identification problem, and a Sargan test to identify a potential over-identification problem of the instrumental variables. 
Further studies
CNCSSF, as a special institutional investor, should have a market-stabilizing function.
As indicated in Figure 1 , the CNSSF and the stock market have a lead-lag relationship, Flow is the social security fund's liquidity ratio. Referring to Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Huang et al. (2007) regarding the definition of the fund's liquidity, and assuming that the cash flow takes place at the end of the term, Flow is defined as follow: 
Mv is the scale of the market value of the social security fund and r is the social security fund investment yield. Flow ratios take into account the scale factors of the social security fund, thus depicting the quarterly liquidity of the social security fund.
If Flow is greater than 0, the social security funds are funneling money into the stock market; Conversely, when Flow is smaller than 0, the social security funds are moving money out of the stock market.
The robustness regression results are shown in Table 7 . It can be easily observed from the overall sample that the CNSSF significantly reduces market volatility. Every 1-percent increase in CNSSF's investment decreases the volatility of the market index by 0.114 percent. This shows that the stabilization function of the CNSSF is highly significant. In addition, the CNSSF direct investment coefficient is significantly negative at the 5-percent level, 2.8 times the entrusted investment coefficient. The economic implications of this result are that with every 1-percent increase in CNSSF direct investment, the CNSSF's effect on market stability is 2.8 times better than that of entrusted investment, which makes its market stabilization function significantly higher than that of entrusted investment. In addition, the results' robustness points out that direct investment is significant at the 10-percent level, while the entrusted investment coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant. This further verifies that direct investment has a stronger stabilization function.
As a further robustness check, we also follow the advice of Zheng (1999) , assuming that capital inflow takes place at the beginning of the term and we repeat the previous regression. The results are almost identical with those in Table 8 , indicating that the results of this paper are robust. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, 1-percent levels, respectively. The value in brackets is the robust White method-adjusted t value.
Conclusion
Our in-depth research on the investment efficiency of the two types of investment carried out by the Chinese National Social Security Fund shows that, on the whole, CNSSF investment efficiency is not high and cannot achieve excess market returns.
More specifically, all entrusted investment portfolio funds combined do achieve excess annual returns of 4.32 percent, while direct investment portfolio funds do not.
At the same time, entrusted investments differ greatly in their return performance; only 40 percent of the fund companies are able to obtain abnormal returns after being given enough compensation for their risk in the market. This article also finds that private information and investment returns are significantly positively correlated, and that the amount of private information involved in direct investment is significantly lower than that involved in entrusted investment, explaining the inefficiency of direct investment. Our further research shows that the CNSSF has an important marketstabilizing function, with the market-stabilizing function of direct investment being almost three times that of entrusted investment.
This article has three main results. Firstly, the CNSSF stock market investment cannot achieve above normal returns but it has a strong market-stabilizing function. In addition, 6 in 10 entrusted investment companies do not show a superb ability to invest in the stock market, resulting in the CNSSF not meeting its "value-added" requirements. Therefore, China's social security system faces a gargantuan pension gap that is extremely perilous for an aging population. How to improve the entrusted companies' investment efficiency has become a pressing issue for the CNSSF. Firstly, the investment of CNSSF should encourage competition. The Chinese National
Council for Social Security Fund should therefore reduce or terminate investments into the investment fund companies with the weakest performance and allocate additional funds to better performing companies. Secondly, private information plays an important role for social security funds' returns. CNSSF has an indisputable advantage in terms of financial strength and information channels. In order to protect the interests of investors and the unbiased market, regulatory agencies need to monitor the social security funds' investment behavior in China to avoid insider trading, market manipulation and other violations of the market. Thirdly, China needs to construct a multi-layered wealth management market, which requires relatively independent institutional investors. These institutional investors' financial innovation as well as R&D should be supported by the social security fund to obtain greater excess returns.
